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I. INTRODUCTION'
There are currently over fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the
world, and nearly a third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists listed by
the United States Treasury Department are associated with sovereignty-based
conflicts and self-determination movements. To date, the "sovereignty first"
international response to these conflicts has been unable to stem the tide of
violence, and in many instances may have contributed to further outbreaks of
violence. To remedy this, the international community is utilizing an evolving
process where sovereignty exists as a spectrum with a range of varying
sovereign statuses as part of that continuum.
Under the doctrine of earned sovereignty, there are three core elements and
three optional elements. The core elements of shared sovereignty, institution
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building and final status necessarily exist in order to guide the sub-state
structure from the intermediate phase through discussions of final status. The
optional elements-conditional sovereignty, phased sovereignty, and con-
strained sovereignty-provide suggestions for shared sovereignty during both
the intermediate phase and final status.
Earned sovereignty is a conflict resolution process that creates an
opportunity for the parties to agree on basic requirements that the emerging
entity must meet during an intermediate phase in order to attain or discuss final
status. Rather than forcing the negotiating parties to determine during
negotiations whether the sub-state entity may or may not be capable or allowed
to exist as an independent state, earned sovereignty allows the parties to make
evaluations of the effect of independence on the parent state as well as emerging
state's success at meeting certain benchmarks before determining final status.
The core elements of earned sovereignty-shared sovereign power, institution
building, and final status-form the structure of this process. An emerging state
will gain varying external and internal powers as it progresses in institution
building throughout intermediate status where sovereign rights are shared with
the parent state or third party, which will finally lead to a pre-determined or
future determined final status. The optional elements of this process provide
options for intermediate status--conditional and phased-as well as for final
status--constrained sovereignty.
The process of earned sovereignty has evolved without name or structure
through its use by international negotiators and state parties to agreements.
State parties to peace agreements have already used this process in an attempt
resolve the conflicts in Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Serbia/Montenegro,
East Timor and Papua New Guinea. Presently negotiators have proposed
similar solutions for the Western Sahara and the Israel/Palestine conflicts, and
the involved parties have been discussing similar proposals for Sri Lanka,
Somalia, and Kashmir.
The purpose of this article is two-fold. It attempts to first define and add
structure to this evolving process and second to spur interest and debate among
those involved in the field. Section one provides an overview of the different
core and optional elements that make up the earned sovereignty process.
Section two outlines fundamental principle that sovereign authority and
functions are both plentiful and severable as internal and external autonomous
rights rather than an all or nothing grant of independence. The need for
monitoring and enforcement bodies is then detailed in section three of the
article.
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II. ELEMENTS OF THE PROCESS
As stated above, the earned sovereignty process allows the parties to
negotiate for individual rights that the sub-state entity will possess in different
forms of shared sovereignty until they meet the conditions for final status or
until final status is determined. Therefore, earned sovereignty is characterized
as encompassing six elements-three core elements and three optional elements.
A. Core Elements
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international
institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to
or in lieu of the parent state. In rare cases, the international community may
exercise shared sovereignty with an internationally recognized state.
The resolution of the conflict in East Timor provides an appropriate
illustration of shared sovereignty. East Timor came under United Nations
supervision after it rejected via referendum a proposal, which would have
provided for autonomy within Indonesia. In light of the violent response by
Indonesian military forces and paramilitary groups in East Timor, Indonesia was
forced to recognize the right of East Timor to independence, and the United
Nations replaced Indonesia as the authority responsible for the management of
sovereignty during the transition to full independence for East Timor. During
the period of shared sovereignty, United Nations officials headed the ministries
of Internal Security, Justice, Political Affairs, Constitutional and Electoral
Affairs, and Finance, while East Timorese headed the ministries of Internal
Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Social
Affairs. The National Consultative Council was chaired by the United Nations
Transitional Administrator and comprised of three United Nations officials and
over a dozen East Timorese appointed by the United Nations Administrator.
The second core element of earned sovereignty is institution building. This
element is utilized during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the
determination of final status. Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the
assistance of the international community, undertakes to construct institutions
for self-government and to build institutions capable of exercising increasing
sovereign authority and functions.
The suggested Roadmap for Peace in Israel and Palestine is centered on the
need for institution building. The Roadmap requires comprehensive institution
building prior to any further discussions of Palestinian provisional statehood.
The Roadmap provides that the Quartet will assist the Palestinians in construct-
ing a number of institutions necessary for assuming greater attributes of
sovereignty. In particular the Roadmap provides for the restructuring of
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security services, the establishment of an Interior Ministry, the appointment of
an interim prime minister or cabinet with executive decision-making capacity,
the adoption of a Palestinian constitution, and the creation of an election
commission.
The final core element of earned sovereignty is the determination of the
final status of the sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. The parties
may agree upon final status during the initial negotiations, but it may also be
determined at a later, agreed upon date. This flexibility in final status decisions
allows the parties to wait to discuss final status until either the parties and
violence has subsided or until the parties meet certain conditions agreed upon
in the initial agreement. In some instances, such as East Timor the final status
is determined during the initial stages of the process, whereas in others such as
Kosovo it occurs after a period of shared sovereignty and institution building.
At some point during the process of earned recognition, it will be necessary
to determine the final status of the sub-state entity. The options for final status
range from substantial autonomy to full independence. While the nature of final
status is frequently determined by a referendum, it may also be determined
through a negotiated settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often
with international mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the
sub-state entity involves the consent of the international community in the form
of international recognition.
Kosovo and East Timor represent both routes for determining final status.
In the Rambouillet Accords, the final status of Kosovo was to be determined
three years later by an international conference, which would take into
consideration the will of the people for independence. On the other hand, the
East Timorese rejection by referendum of the proposal for autonomy within
Indonesia settled the question of final status in favor of total independence for
East Timor.
B. Optional Elements
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty
entails the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority
and functions over a specified time period prior to the determination of final
status. In order to enhance the relationship between shared sovereignty and
institution building some earned sovereignty agreements have incorporated the
element of phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured
devolution of sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or
international community to the sub-state entity during the period of shared
sovereignty. The negotiating parties may correlate the timing and extent of the
devolution of authority and functions with the development of institutional
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capacity and/or conditioned on the fulfillment of certain conditions such as
democratic reform and the protection of human rights.
The Bougainville Agreement, which ended the conflict between the
Bougainville sub-state and Papua New Guinea, implements the optional element
of phased sovereignty. The Agreement gives heightened autonomy for
Bougainville with the gradual grant of increasing control over a wide range of
powers, functions, personnel and resources based on guarantees contained in the
National Constitution.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality
may be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and
functions by the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the
sub-state entity's final status. In either case, the sub-state entity is required to
meet certain benchmarks before it may acquire increased sovereignty. These
benchmarks may include conditions such as protecting human and minority
rights, developing democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and
promoting regional stability.
The case of Kosovo provides the most detailed example of conditional
sovereignty. In 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted a proposal
by UNMIK identified as "standards before status." In brief, the United Nations
had determined that before Kosovo could undertake final status negotiations to
secure independence it must meet a number of standards or benchmarks.
According to UNMIK, the general prerequisites of the standards before status
approach required the parties to fully comply with and implement Resolution
1244 and the Constitutional Framework, which included multi-ethnicity,
acceptance, security, and fairness under normal conditions.' Specifically, the
benchmarks covered the areas of functioning democratic institutions, rule of
law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration, economic reform
and development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible
operation of the Kosovo Protection Corps.
The last optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on
the right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states. The
Dayton Accords, which ended the Bosnian conflict, were structured around the
concept of constrain sovereignty. The Dayton Accords required many of the
sovereign authorities and functions of the independent state of Bosnia to be
3. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Standards Before Status, May 2002, available at
http://www.unmikonline.orglpub/focuskos/aprO2benchmarks-eng.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004); see also
Press Release, U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Highlights Of The Introductory Remarks at a Press Conference By
Michael Steiner, Special Representative Of The Secretary-General In Kosovo, June 27, 2002, available at
http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/pc020627.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
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managed by an internationally appointed High Representative for an indetermi-
nate period.4 The Accords also provided for the deployment of international
military forces to maintain internal security. While conditionality is not
explicit, the pattern of practice in Bosnia indicates that the international civilian
authority will be discontinued only upon such a time as Bosnia can adequately
function as an independent state.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AS A BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
In order to best utilize the process of earned sovereignty, which allows for
negotiation on individual sovereign rights and responsibilities, the international
community has begun to re-shape the historical concept of sovereignty. There
are several different meanings of the term sovereignty.5 In the context of this
discussion, sovereignty is concerned with establishing the status of a state entity
in the international system as well as determining its internal governing rights.
Under the conventional view, an entity qualified as a sovereign state if it had a
territory, a population, a government, and international recognition.6 If an entity
did not qualify as a sovereign state, it was deemed a dependent or subordinate
territory of a sovereign state. Thus, an entity was either sovereign or it was not.
There was no concept of an intermediate status such as that suggested by earned
sovereignty.
States perceive sovereignty as a "ticket of general admission to the
international arena."7 A sovereign state is accepted as an equal of other states.
It is entitled to political independence, territorial integrity, and virtually
exclusive control and jurisdiction within that territory.8 The state's sovereign
acts are generally immune from civil suit in other states, its representatives are
entitled to diplomatic immunity from both civil and criminal actions, and its
ruler is entitled to absolute head of state immunity. It can enter into agreements
with other States. It can be a member of international organizations. Dependent
or subordinate territories, in contrast, do not customarily possess any of these
rights in the international system.9
The international community's unwillingness to consider partially
sovereign options for conflict resolution has hindered diplomats in their effort
4. See generally Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996).
5. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9-25 (Princeton Univ. Press
1999) (explaining the four meanings of sovereignty that Krasner describes, we are concerned here with what
Krasner labels "International Legal Sovereignty").
6. Id. at 14-15.
7. MICHAELROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, ANDTHE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE
EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 12 (Pennsylvania State Univ. Press 1995).
8. KRASNER, supra note 5, at 20-21.
9. KRASNER, supra note 5, at 16-17.
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to construct creative means for resolving conflicts involving attempts at self-
determination or secession. For example, one scholar argues that the Western
powers' inability to move beyond this black and white perception of sovereignty
was partly responsible for both Bosnia's collapse.' The adoption of historical
conceptions of sovereignty was disastrous in the Yugoslavia negotiations
because the opposing parties were unable to move beyond the preservation of
Yugoslavia as a state. This perception has also made it difficult to resolve
conflicts in Sierra Leona and Chechnya. Moreover, the ability to move beyond
the statist/secessionist norm may aid in the resolution of self-determination
conflicts, which are spawning ground of terrorist movements. Terrorism is a
mechanism too frequently used by self-determination and thus solving these
sovereignty-based conflicts may in turn reduce terrorism.
To remedy this, it is necessary for the international community to further
develop sovereignty existing as a spectrum and to recognize a range of varying
sovereign statuses and rights as part of that spectrum. The international
community must therefore recognize that states have both external and internal
powers, which are made up of individual rights that are both plentiful and
severable. The external sovereign rights may include:
1) The right to territorial integrity;
2) The right to defend the state through the use of force;
3) The right to govern by establishing, applying and enforcing law;
4) Eligibility for international organizations;
5) The capacity to act as a legal entity for owning, purchasing
transferring property, etc.;
6) Grant of sovereign immunity for noncommercial activities and
consular relations;
7) Capacity to sign international agreements;
8) The duty to respect other nations; and
9) The obligation to abide by international law.
A state or sub-state's internal governing rights may consist of:
1) Taxation;
2) Determining governing structures and political policies;
3) Providing for social welfare;
4) Regulating the judicial system;
5) Creating internal law; and
6) Managing state infrastructures.
10. Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Postcolonial Age,
32 STAN. J. INT'L L 255, 282 (1996).
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The concept of earned sovereignty enables negotiation on each of these
points. As an example, the intermediate phase entity may not have the
capability to defend itself externally or have a grant of sovereign immunity, but
it does have the legal right to govern itself, lay taxes and law, to be represented
in international organizations, and to sign international agreements. With this
in mind, the importance of using new concepts of sovereignty becomes
apparent. Negotiations that would normally be shut down by the first mention
of independence may now proceed as a negotiation for individual sovereign
rights without the weight of the term "independence." Thus, the parties may
discuss those external and internal rights that the new entity will possess as well
as those that will not be granted to the new entity. In the end, the term
independence is irrelevant. The importance is placed instead on the individual
rights possessed by the new entity.
IV. ENFORCEABILITY/MONTORING
The key to any successful negotiation is the ability to enforce and monitor
the implementation of the agreement. Earned sovereignty is unique in that it
inherently entices compliance. Through the use of the optional elements, the
state must comply with the agreement before it will gain further internal or
external sovereign rights and responsibilities. Because of this concept's nature,
however, monitoring and enforcement play and important role. Regional or
international monitoring groups, or a combination of the two, are necessary for
the optional element of phased sovereignty in order to guarantee that both
parties meet their stated agreements for the sovereign powers delegated in the
next phase of sovereignty. Conditional sovereignty will require a monitoring
agent who will determine whether the parties have met the specified conditions.
Although the monitoring/enforcement body is not as involved for constrained
sovereignty agreements, a body is needed to assure that the parent state is not
denying the sub-state entity its guaranteed rights under the agreement.
Earned sovereignty naturally facilitates enforcement and monitoring by
setting specific guidelines. The guidelines provide the monitoring group with
a symbolic checklist for determination of the success or failure of each tenet of
the agreement.
In many situations, the parties decide that objectives of a monitoring
mechanism are best met when the monitors are international. In these cases, the
monitoring mechanism might be the United Nations, a regional body such as the
Organization of American States or the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, an ad hoc group of nations, or combinations of the
above. Papa New Guinea provides an example of this because the international
Truce Monitoring Group and the presence of a United Nations Political Office
for Bougainville augment the domestic mechanisms.
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V. CONCLUSION
There are currently over thirty active civil wars in the world, the resolution
of which generally results in the extermination or expulsion of the losing party.
The resolution of these conflicts stops the constant cycle of violence. Thus, the
changing face of international conflicts necessitates the exploration and
development of evolving conflict resolution processes such as earned sover-
eignty. No longer do states fight wars until one-side surrenders. The new self-
determination conflicts last for decades where neither side will give up because
each side in the conflict has valid concerns and plenty of financial backing.
While it is not always difficult to get the conflict parties to sit at the negotiating
table, it is often hard to keep them there. The consideration of sovereign rights
as individual negotiating points as well as the ability to consider and discuss the
core and optional elements allows for flexibility in negotiation to combat this
problem.
